

Mobile App Security

An introduction

Marc Obrador



APP JECURITY FRAMEWORK

Who am I?



Marc Obrador

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2. Some Common Threads

- 1. Man-In-The-Middle
- 2. App Tampering & Repackaging
- 3. Root / Jailbreak

3. Recap




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
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
Why Mobile App Security?


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Mobile AppSec vs "traditional" Cyber Securtity








Let's first switch our perspective






The hacker's perspective




Make it unattractive for the hacker




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Things to protect



User Data

Business Data / IP

DRM





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
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
MITM



HTTPS is assumed!

MITM with HTTPS?

No, if Certificate Pinning is used



Android: depends on OEM



iOS: requires social engineering




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












Cheating on games

Getting paid features for free

Stealing user data



Android: apktool + *smali* code

```
.method protected onCreate(Landroid/os/Bundle;)V
    .locals 2
    .param p1, "savedInstanceState" # Landroid/os/Bundle;
    .line 12
    invoke-super {p0, p1}, Landroidx/appcompat/app/AppCompatActivity;->onCreate(Landroid/os/Bundle;)V
    const v0, 0x7f0a001c
    invoke-virtual {p0, v0}, Lcom/build38/smali/MainActivity;->setContentView(I)V
    .line 15
    const v0, 0x7f0700a9
    invoke-virtual {p0, v0}, Lcom/build38/smali/MainActivity;->findViewById(I)Landroid/view/View;
    move-result-object v0
    check-cast v0, Landroid/widget/TextView;
    const-string v1, "Hello, Wien!"
    invoke-virtual {v0, v1}, Landroid/widget/TextView;->setText(Ljava/lang/CharSeguence;)V
    .line 16
    return-void
end method
```

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iOS: dynamic library injection





Protecting against app repackaging

(A)	function setText(data) { document.getElementById("myDiv").innerHTML = data; }
	<pre>function ghds3x(n) { h = "\x69\u006En\u0065r\x48T\u004DL"; a="s c v o v d h e , n i";x=a.split(" ");b="gztxleWentBsyf"; b.replace("z",x[7]).replace("x","E").replace("s","").replace("f","I") ["repl" + "ace"]("W","m")+"d"; ny"+String.fromCharCode(68)+x[10]+"v"; s=x[5]+x[3]+x[1]+"um"+x[7]+x[9]+"t";d=this[s][r](c);if(+!![]) { d[h]=n; } else { d[h]=c; })</pre>



Obfuscation

Detect it

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The "sandbox" model

					-			
generic_x80	5:/	# ls -1	l /data/	/data,	/			
total 808								-
					2019-05-29			
drwx	4	u0_a2	u0_a2	4096	2019-05-29	20:03	com.android.backuncanfi	
drwx	4	u0_a34	u0_a34	4096	2019-05-29	20:03	COM. and	
drwx	4	u0_a36	u0_a36	4096	2019-05-29	20:03	com.anobookmarkprovider	
drwx	4	u0_a47	u0_a47	4096	2019-05-29	20:03	com.android.calculator2	
drwx	4	u0_a1	u0_a1	4096	2019-05-29	20:03	com.android.calllogbackup	-
drwx	5	u0_a44	u0_a44	4096	2019-05-29	20:04	com.android.camera2	
drwx	4	u0_a39	u0_a39	4096	2019-05-29	20:03	com.android.captiveportallogin	
drwx	4	u0_a3	u0_a3	4096	2019-05-29	20:03	com.android.carrierconfig	
drwx	4	u0_a6	u0_a6	4096	2019-05-29	20:03	com.android.cellbroadcastreceiver	
drwx	4	u0_a38	u0_a38	4096	2019-05-29	20:03	com.android.certinstaller	
drwx	12	u0_a49	u0_a49	4096	2019-05-29	20:08	com.android.chrome	
drwx	4	u0_a40	u0_a40	4096	2019-05-29	20:03	com.android.companiondevicemanager	
drwx	5	u0_a13	u0_a13	4096	2019-05-29	20:04	com.android.contacts	
drwx	4	u0_a41	u0_a41	4096	2019-05-29	20:03	com.android.cts.ctsshim	
drwx	4	u0_a8	u0_a8	4096	2019-05-29	20:03	com.android.cts.priv.ctsshim	
drwx	4	u0_a42	u0_a42	4096	2019-05-29	20:03	com.android.customlocale2	
drwx	4	u0_a7	u0_a7	4096	2019-05-29	20:03	com.android.defcontainer	
drwx	4	u0_a43	u0_a43	4096	2019-05-29	20:03	com.android.development	
drwx	6	u0_a10	u0_a10	4096	2019-05-29	20:11	com.android.documentsui	
drwx	4	u0_a33	u0_a33	4096	2019-05-29	20:03	com.android.dreams.basic	
drwx	4	u0_a45	u0_a45	4096	2019-05-29	20:03	com.android.egg	

Root / Jailbreak Detection







Google Play Protect

/scottyab/rootbeer /KimChangYoun/rootbeerFresh /Stericson/RootTools /avltree9798/isJailbroken /thii/DTTJailbreakDetection

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What to do if Root / Jailbreak is found?



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What to do if Root is found?



TE.

Malicious websites were used to secretly hack into iPhones for years, says Google


Zack Whittaker

@zackwhittaker / 7:33 pm PDT • August 29, 2019

Sources:

- https://techcrunch.com/2019/08/29/google-iphone-secretly-hacked/
- https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2019/08/a-very-deep-dive-into-ios-exploit.html

What to do if Root is found?





Restrict some sensitive functionality



Deny service



Design your security model assuming that root can (and will) happen





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- 100% protection does not exist aim for "good enough"
- Certificate Pinning is a good idea
- Apps can be reverse engineered and repackaged
 - Move security-relevant logic to backend or write it in native C
- Root can be really bad come up with a plan





Thank you!

Any questions?